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FOOTPRINT ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
SHERMAN ACT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Nima H. Mohebbi* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
John Graver Johnson was a Philadelphia lawyer whose practice 
thrived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Professionally, 
he was a mere practitioner for most of his life.  He eschewed prominence 
by rejecting countless prestigious public positions offered to him, including 
two appointments to the Supreme Court of the United States.  He did this 
for the love of his practice. 
However, it cannot be implied that his accomplishments are not 
worthy of illustrious recognition.  Johnson tried thousands of cases in 
various courts—from the Pennsylvania Superior Court to the Supreme 
Court of the United States.  His clientele included both the poor and the 
social elite.  His analytical abilities, shrewd legal skills, and photographic 
memory were unparalleled by his peers at the time.  And while his 
achievements were considerable, there are few recent works written about 
him.
1
 
A quote by George Sharswood, former Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, details the likely reason Johnson does not have the 
enduring recognition he unquestionably deserves: 
In the reports we find at least some evidence of the judges who 
helped to elucidate, to state and to perpetuate the law; but what, 
 
 *  Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, Southern District of West 
Virginia, 2010-2011.  J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School.  B.S., West Virginia 
University.  My thanks to the Honorable Louis Pollak for his comments on an earlier 
version of this article.  Thanks are also due to Craig Reiser and Samuel Greenberg for their 
insightful critiques, to Ethan Marcovici and the editors at the journal who worked on this 
article, and to Tracy Low and my family.  The errors and opinions expressed are, of course, 
my own. 
 1. The University of Pennsylvania Press published Barnie Winkelman‟s biography of 
John G. Johnson in 1942, but that work is not currently in print.  See BARNIE WINKELMAN, 
JOHN G. JOHNSON: LAWYER AND ART COLLECTOR (1942). 
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even in the case of the greatest of the great lawyers, remains of 
the brilliant arguments which won verdicts and secured 
decisions?  The court rooms themselves, which were the theatres 
of their triumphs and the audiences, which, entranced, hung upon 
their lips, have not more completely vanished than has the 
remembrance of their utterances.
2
 
Because Johnson avoided status and prestige, history gave him a 
forceful but passing glance.  The literature that is available will never be 
able completely to recall the brilliant arguments he devised and the 
strategies he employed to win many of his cases.  Nor will it be able to give 
a full account of the effects he personally had on the lives of those with 
whom he interacted.  His profession did not lend itself to this sort of 
recognition, and indeed, he may have wanted it this way. 
This article seeks to examine two of Johnson‟s achievements.  First, 
the article discusses Johnson‟s efforts in United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 
(“Knight”), where the Supreme Court held that Congress could not regulate 
intrastate manufacturing processes under its Article I Commerce Clause 
power.
3
  This article further discusses the subsequent expansion of 
Congress‟s regulatory authority throughout most of the twentieth century.  
In this respect, it briefly illuminates the impact Johnson‟s original 
arguments have had on federalism jurisprudence. 
Second, this article illustrates how Johnson‟s arguments in Northern 
Securities Co. v. United States for an economic-driven and practical 
approach to antitrust law were antecedent to the Court‟s ultimate adoption 
of a “rule of reason” approach to antitrust inquiries under the Sherman 
Act.
4
  It further discusses the actual genesis of the “rule of reason” and a 
few of the other landmark cases that Johnson argued in this respect. 
Accordingly, the article proceeds as follows:  Section II briefly 
describes Johnson‟s biographical and professional background.  Section III 
discusses the progressive political environment during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries in which Johnson‟s practice with large 
corporations thrived.  Section IV explains the statutory and constitutional 
bases implicated in Knight.  Section IV.A introduces Knight and discusses 
its disposition as well as some of Johnson‟s subsequent notable cases 
involving the Commerce Clause.  Section IV.B briefly elucidates the 
 
 2. Hampton L. Carson, John G. Johnson, A Great American Lawyer, 3 CORNELL L. Q. 
100, 117 (1918). 
 3. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895) (“The fact that an article is 
manufactured for export to another State does not, of itself, make it an article of interstate 
commerce . . . .”). 
 4. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 331 (1904) (“[T]he act is not limited to 
restraints of interstate and international trade or commerce that are unreasonable in their 
nature, but embraces all direct restraints imposed by any combination, conspiracy or 
monopoly upon such trade or commerce.”) (emphasis in original). 
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continuing federalism concerns over Congress‟s power to regulate broadly 
various types of activity under the Commerce Clause.  Finally, Section V 
describes Johnson‟s influence on modern antitrust jurisprudence. 
To be sure, the efforts in this article do not nearly capture the breadth 
and true impact of Johnson‟s work.  It cannot do that; no biographical work 
could.  It attempts only to demonstrate how his arguments in a series of 
Supreme Court cases have contributed to important federal law.  It is the 
author‟s hope that this discussion will encourage further writing on 
Johnson and his impact on other important constitutional, antitrust, and 
corporate legal doctrines that are not covered in this article. 
II.  A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY 
John Graver Johnson was born in Chestnut Hill, Pennsylvania, in 
1841.
5
  His mother was a milliner, and his father was a blacksmith.
6
  He 
graduated from high school in 1857 with a term average that placed him 
second in his class.
7
  He was immediately interested in the law and, upon 
graduating from high school, he began studying it in the late hours of the 
evening while working as a scrivener in the Philadelphia offices of 
Benjamin Rush.
8
  Johnson eventually became associated with the offices of 
Philadelphia lawyer William F. Judson, where he “supported himself . . . by 
collecting rents, by engrossing deeds and copying legal papers.”
9
  While 
working in Judson‟s office, he began attending George Sharswood‟s 
lectures at the Law Department of the University of Pennsylvania.
10
  After 
eventually passing the bar and graduating from the Law Department in 
1863, he became Judson‟s successor shortly after Judson prematurely 
passed away.
11
 
The few works on Johnson‟s life make clear his natural, striking wit 
and impressive legal skills.  For example, his obituary in the April 14, 1917 
edition of the New York Times stated that, as a schoolboy, Johnson 
frequently memorized Shakespeare plays for amusement.
12
  Hampton 
 
 5. Henry McAllister, John G. Johnson, Lawyer, 26 DICTA 149, 149 (1942). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Carson, supra note 2, at 100 (noting Johnson‟s average of monthly results in written 
examinations while he was in high school). 
 8. Mary Louise Ramsey, Art and the Law: The Two Loves of John G. Johnson, 60 
A.B.A. J. 1400, 1400 (1974). 
 9. Carson, supra note 2, at 101. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  According to Ramsey, this position became incredibly lucrative during the 
economic panic of 1873.  Ramsey, supra note 8, at 1400.  During this time, Johnson‟s firm 
had the job of foreclosing many of the mortgages which it held as trustee.  Id.  And, “under 
the practice then prevailing, [the firm] received a fee equal to 5 per cent of each mortgage 
foreclosed.”  Id. 
 12. John G. Johnson, Noted Attorney, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 1917, at E2, 
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Carson‟s brief account of Johnson‟s career, chronicled in the 1918 edition 
of the Virginia Law Register, stated that Johnson, as a student in William 
Judson‟s office, was forced to labor unrelentingly over preliminary drafts 
of legal documents and complete a variety of other legal tasks: 
Whatever might be argued, as was done later, against the 
barbarous terminology, the tautologies, the subtleties, and the too 
minute insistence upon purely formal matters, there can be no 
doubt that the legal wit of man never devised a more searching 
method of analysis in determining the substance of a controversy, 
or in narrowing allegations to specific issues, whether of law or 
fact, than the now obsolete system of pleading.  It enabled a man 
of fine analytical powers to cultivate the faculty of legal 
diagnosis, and it was in this that . . . Johnson . . . excelled all 
competitors . . . .
13
 
Thus, practicing the methods of legal reasoning within the confines of 
precedent and statutory authority—and practicing those methods ad 
nauseam—helped acquaint Johnson with the practice of law. 
Yet despite his wit, Johnson was a pragmatist who would hesitate to 
take cases he did not believe he could argue successfully.
14
  He was not 
interested in politics and did not care for using law as a means to enact 
social reform.
15
  As an illustration of his lack of interest in politics and 
public service, Johnson politely turned down a seat on the Supreme Court 
of the United States offered to him by President Garfield in 1881.
16
  He 
declined the same offer from President Cleveland years later.
17
  It was even 
alleged in a letter written by Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President 
Truman that, in proffering his reasons for turning down President 
Cleveland‟s offer, Johnson explained, “I would rather talk to the damned 
fools than listen to them.”
18
 
In all probability, Johnson never held public office because he did not 
want the responsibilities and ethical obligations of these positions to 
 
available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=F30714FD3E5E11738DDDAC0994DC405B878DF1D3 (last visited July 26, 
2011). 
 13. Carson, supra note 2, at 102. 
 14. See McAllister, supra note 5, at 151 (discussing Johnson‟s practices in giving legal 
opinions). 
 15. Barnie F. Winkelman, Carnegie, Frick and John G. Johnson, 7 TEMP. L. Q. 397, 
413 (1933). 
 16. John G. Johnson, Noted Attorney, Dies, supra note 12. 
 17. Id.; McAllister, supra note 5, at 152.  In addition to his Supreme Court offers, 
President McKinley unsuccessfully attempted to convince Johnson to become Attorney 
General.  John G. Johnson, Noted Attorney, Dies, supra note 12. 
 18. Letter from Dean Acheson to Harry S. Truman (Oct. 8, 1957) in AMONG FRIENDS: 
PERSONAL LETTERS OF DEAN ACHESON 131 (David S. McLellan & David C. Acheson eds., 
1980). 
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jeopardize his private practice.
19
  In that vein, he was at heart a respecter of 
stare decisis and did not typically inquire into the policies behind the law, 
except insofar as those policies could benefit his cases.  Indeed, there can 
be little question that he embodied the purest form of a practicing lawyer. 
As a practitioner, Johnson argued an astounding number of cases 
throughout his lifetime at both the state and federal levels, including 1525 
cases in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, forty-three in the appellate 
courts of other jurisdictions, sixty-nine in Federal District Courts and 
Courts of Appeals around the country, and 168 in the Supreme Court of the 
United States.
20
  Indeed, this impressive body of work engulfs over 300 
bound volumes of his personal papers.  Amazingly, however, these 
statistics represent his work mostly in appellate courts.  Unfortunately, 
there is no easily-accessible, complete record of the cases he handled at the 
trial level, even though his trial practice was quite extensive.
21
 
His clientele extended from the poor to titans of industry in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
22
  He rejected retainers he thought 
were too excessive, and his fees were by no means extreme.
23
  He was 
motivated primarily by the novelty of the legal issues that cases presented, 
not the prestige of the client,
24
 ostensibly a function of “his love for his 
profession, his zest for battle, and the lure of the game . . . .”
25
  Even when 
he was at the peak of his career, he would not refuse a case simply because 
it would render an insignificant fee or involve a trivial piece of property.
26
  
Regardless of his reasons, Johnson‟s life was remarkable, and he had a 
profound effect on the law. 
III.  HIS GREATEST YEARS 
Johnson‟s most notable years in practice spanned the early twentieth 
century after the apex of industrial expansion in the United States.
27
  His 
reputation as an effective business advocate at this time was pervasive 
 
 19. Winkelman, Carnegie, Frick and John G. Johnson, supra note 15, at 413. 
 20. Carson, supra note 2, at 117. 
 21. Id. at 112.  For a more detailed account of Johnson‟s trial-level endeavors, see id. at 
110-17. 
 22. See McAllister, supra note 5, at 150 (noting that Johnson stated, “If those New 
York fellows [titans of industry like J.P. Morgan] want to see me they can come to 
Philadelphia, and if they came . . . and Johnson was . . . in conference with some poor 
washer woman . . . they would have to cool their heels in the anteroom until he got 
through.”); Winkelman, Carnegie, Frick and John G. Johnson, supra note 15, at 398 
(discussing the demographics of Johnson‟s clients). 
 23. Winkelman, Carnegie, Frick and John G. Johnson, supra note 15, at 400. 
 24. Carson, supra note 2, at 107. 
 25. Winkelman, Carnegie, Frick and John G. Johnson, supra note 15, at 400. 
 26. John G. Johnson, Noted Attorney, Dies, supra note 12. 
 27. Winkelman, Carnegie, Frick and John G. Johnson, supra note 15, at 398-403. 
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among important Wall Street businessmen.
28
  For example, Barnie 
Winkelman described the intense competition for Johnson‟s services in a 
historic controversy between Andrew Carnegie and Henry Clay Frick over 
partnership shares in Carnegie Steel Company.
29
  It was also said that J.P. 
Morgan would arrange special trains that could take Johnson from 
Philadelphia to New York City for private consultations.
30
 
That industry was in need of his valuable counsel more than ever 
during these critical years is subject to little contention.
31
  This was 
principally because the “[r]apid economic development” of the late 
nineteenth century had inevitably “provoked [intense] political 
responses.”
32
  These responses included the Progressive Movement, which 
sought to end the mounting industrial monopolies that had developed and 
grown in remarkable haste.  The perception among many was that large 
trusts were attempting unjustly to extinguish all competition so that they 
could charge excess prices and control the levers of democracy in the 
United States.
33
  As evidence of the common sentiment, President Theodore 
Roosevelt, one of the undisputed champions of the Progressive Movement, 
issued a warning on the need for prophylactic government regulation of the 
expanding “industrial system”:  “More and more it is evident that the State, 
and if necessary the nation, has got to possess the right of supervision and 
control as regards the great corporations which are its creatures.”
34
  It was 
in this environment that Johnson‟s practice thrived on a national level. 
While industry leaders demanded his services in many contexts,
35
 he 
exhibited his greatest contributions to Supreme Court jurisprudence in his 
arguments against the expansion of Congress‟s use of the Commerce 
Clause
36
 to regulate business, as well as in his endeavors to interpret the 
Sherman Act.
37
  The questions on the Commerce Clause arose in Johnson‟s 
 
 28. Id. at 398. 
 29. Id. at 404 (noting that Carnegie‟s “frantic efforts” to obtain Johnson‟s services were 
to no avail because Frick “got him first.” (quoting JOHN K. WINKLER, INCREDIBLE CARNEGIE 
(1931)). 
 30. McAllister, supra note 5, at 150. 
 31. See GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTIMONOPOLY 
TRADITION AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA, 1865-1896 126 (1997) (discussing 
aspects of the anti-business environment during this time). 
 32. Id.  Professor Ritter also notes that “[w]orkers responded [adversely] to the 
appearance of the wage system, the loss of shop floor control, and the segmentation of 
communities that accompanied the advance of the corporation.”  Id. 
 33. See BERNADETTE BREXEL, PROSECUTING TRUSTS: THE COURTS BREAK UP 
MONOPOLIES IN AMERICA 7 (2006) (discussing the anti-trust sentiments that existed during 
this time). 
 34. EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 30 (2001). 
 35. See supra note 29. 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
 37. See Winkelman, Carnegie, Frick and John G. Johnson, supra note 15, at 415-17 
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cases principally because the government began utilizing the Sherman 
Act
38
 as a primary weapon to break up large, anticompetitive trusts.
39
 
Within this framework, Section IV of this article discusses one of 
Johnson‟s greatest victories in the Supreme Court: United States v. E. C. 
Knight Co.  In its decision in Knight, the Court functionally limited the 
government‟s ability to use the Sherman Act to its fullest extent.
40
  While 
the basic holding in Knight lasted for nearly a decade, Johnson‟s arguments 
in Commerce Clause cases eventually fell to the losing end in subsequent 
cases.
41
  Those losses paved the way for the rapid expansion of Congress‟s 
regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause, an interpretation which 
lasted until the late twentieth century. 
Finally, despite his ultimate shortcomings in interpreting the 
Commerce Clause, Johnson‟s work in important antitrust cases in the early 
twentieth century helped facilitate the Court‟s adoption of an economic-
driven and practical approach to assessing antitrust inquiries under the 
Sherman Act.  Those matters are further discussed in Section V. 
IV.  THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
In its original form, the Sherman Act limited two types of restraints on 
trade.  First, section 1 provided that:  “Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be 
illegal.”
42
  Section 2 contained a prohibition on monopolization in restraint 
of trade or commerce.
43
  Both provisions were written so as to utilize the 
full benefit of constitutional regulatory power by textually mirroring the 
language of the Commerce Clause itself.
44
  The key on the scope of the 
applicability of the Sherman Act, then, would turn on the Court‟s 
interpretation of the scope of the Commerce Clause. 
Before Knight was decided, the Supreme Court had adopted a slightly 
 
(discussing some of Johnson‟s most notable accomplishments). 
 38. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2008). 
 39. See MORRIS, supra note 34, at 60-63 (describing President Roosevelt‟s preference 
for a strict antitrust enforcement policy). 
 40. See infra Section IV.A (discussing Knight and its consequent history). 
 41. See id. (discussing Johnson‟s failed attempts to invoke the essential holding in 
Knight). 
 42. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2008)). 
 43. Id. at § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony . . . .”). 
 44. Compare id, with U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .”). 
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broader view on the ability of Congress to regulate activities under the 
Commerce Clause.
45
  In Knight, as will be shown, Johnson was able to 
seize advantage of a narrow point of reasoning derived from the Court‟s 
prior decisions to present an argument against regulation of his client‟s 
manufacturing and refining activities on Commerce Clause grounds. 
A.  Knight and Johnson’s Approach 
In Knight, the defendant American Sugar Refining Company 
(“American Sugar”) had purchased four sugar refineries in Philadelphia.
46
  
With the purchases, the company had acquired roughly ninety-eight percent 
of the sugar refining market in the United States.
47
  Shortly after the 
acquisitions, the Cleveland Administration brought suit against American 
Sugar under the Sherman Act,
48
 on the ground that the contracts by which it 
had made the purchases constituted illegal combinations in restraint of 
trade and commerce.
49
  The government sought injunctive relief to prevent 
the acquisitions.
50
  American Sugar retained Johnson to argue the case at 
the trial level, and he saw the case through to its argument in the Supreme 
Court.
51
 
As discussed, the national sentiment was growing impatient toward 
big business.
52
  It seemed, thus, that Johnson faced an uphill battle.  In fact, 
the executives of American Sugar were extremely concerned that the 
company would inevitably lose the case.
53
  As Barnie Winkelman notes, 
 
 45. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824) (defining the 
contours of the commerce power and noting that commerce is “intercourse”).  To be sure, 
before and after Knight was decided, the Court‟s Commerce Clause jurisprudence remained 
somewhat confusing.  It had allowed regulation where an activity touched upon matters that 
affected the channels of commerce.  See Bradford C. Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the 
Endangered Species Act Constitutional Under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 
375, 381-83 (2007) (discussing the Court‟s early approach toward Congress‟s ability to 
regulate activity affecting interstate commerce (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 
238, 304 (1936))).  The Court also allowed Congressional regulation where intrastate 
activities exerted some effect on national commerce or where the regulation implicated an 
important matter of public interest.  See, e.g., Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 
321 (1903) (permitting regulation where the purchase and transportation of lottery tickets 
involved interstate channels because of the relative harmful nature of the regulated items). 
 46. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9 (1895). 
 47. Winkelman, Carnegie, Frick and John G. Johnson, supra note 15, at 415. 
 48. HANNIS TAYLOR, THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 436 
(1998). 
 49. Knight, 156 U.S. at 9. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Winkelman, Carnegie, Frick and John G. Johnson, supra note 15, at 415-16. 
 52. Brexel, supra note 33. 
 53. See WINKELMAN, JOHN G. JOHNSON: LAWYER AND ART COLLECTOR, supra note 1, at 
175 (discussing the concern of the sugar executives during the proceedings). 
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however:  “Johnson‟s defense was bold and brilliant.  It conceded 
practically all the facts set forth in the bill of complaint[, but] . . . 
interposed a legalistic objection, that could have been made only by one 
who was confident of the temper of the court . . . [and] the finely balanced 
forces of the day.”
54
 
Johnson, however, was much more than confident.  He urged a narrow 
construction of the Act, arguing that the Commerce Clause only permitted 
regulation of activities that directly affected interstate commerce, not those 
intrastate activities—such as the refining of sugar—which merely had an 
incidental effect.
55
  As Johnson explained in American Sugar‟s brief to the 
Supreme Court of the United States: 
The Congress . . . has no jurisdiction over articles which are 
manufactured, because of the fact that they are manufactured 
with an intent later to sell the same to citizens of another State, or 
to transport them to another States.  No article forms part of the 
trade or commerce which can be regulated by Congress until it is 
bought, sold or exchanged, for the purpose of such transit, or is 
put in the way of transit by being delivered to a carrier, or 
otherwise.
56
 
The argument appeared to draw on an inference implicit from cases 
such as Gibbons v. Ogden.  Where Gibbons helped define the scope of 
commerce that was wholly intrastate, in part by stating that Congress could 
regulate intrastate activities if they exerted an effect on national 
commerce,
57
 Johnson contended that the refining process of American 
Sugar did not in any way have such an effect because it was, in essence, 
simply the middle of a comprehensive economic process designed to sell 
finished sugar. 
This strategy placed the probability of defeat solely on the 
persuasiveness of the noted argument.  American Sugar‟s executives were 
initially quite apprehensive about the approach, but Johnson felt that it 
presented the only “real promise of success.”
58
  Thus, he frequently 
 
 54. Winkelman, Carnegie, Frick and John G. Johnson, supra note 15, at 416. 
 55. Id.  One commentator opines that Johnson‟s ability to form this argument was based 
in part on the lack of specificity in the government‟s complaint.  See Rudolf Sobernheim, 
Book Review of John G. Johnson – Lawyer and Art Collector, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 721 
(1942) (discussing how Attorney General Olney doubted the Sherman Act‟s validity and 
attempted to plead the case narrower than would show a “monopoly of commerce”). 
 56. Appellees‟ Brief at 17, United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (No. 
15,548). 
 57. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (“Commerce among the 
States cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the 
interior.”). 
 58. WINKELMAN, JOHN G. JOHNSON: LAWYER AND ART COLLECTOR, supra note 1, at 
175. 
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“brushed aside the many suggestions that came from [the executives] as to 
[additional] facts and legal conclusions that should be presented to the 
court[,]” leaving all of the case‟s tactical decisions to himself.
59
  It was 
even documented that, despite the obvious importance of the case, he 
would frequently make the anxious sugar magnates wait in his office for 
extended periods of time while he served other poorer clients.
60
 
The Court in Knight, speaking through Justice Fuller, adopted 
Johnson‟s proposed narrow construction of the act.
61
  Specifically, it held: 
[T]he contracts and acts of the defendants related exclusively to 
the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries and the business of 
sugar refining in Pennsylvania, and bore no direct relation to 
commerce between the States or with foreign nations. . . . [And 
while i]t is true that the bill alleged that the products of these 
refineries were sold and distributed among the several States, . . . 
[t]here was nothing in the proofs to indicate any intention to put a 
restraint upon trade or commerce, and the fact, as we have seen, 
that trade or commerce might be indirectly affected [is] not 
enough to entitle complainants to a decree.
62
 
Thus, the act did not reach the refining activities of American Sugar; 
otherwise, it would have represented an unconstitutional use of Congress‟s 
Commerce Clause authority. 
Also implicit in Johnson‟s argument was the contention that a broad 
reading of the Commerce Clause would diminish States‟ rights.  He 
stressed that construing the Sherman Act to reach the manufacturing 
process would inevitably bring about a federal stranglehold on local 
transactions that the states were better equipped to deal with themselves:
63
 
The State of Pennsylvania might forbid the manufacture of sugar 
within its limits.  Congress could not prevent this, because such 
regulation would not interfere with trade or commerce between 
the States, even though such trade might indirectly be affected. 
[To allow as much would be a] “pretension . . . [that] would 
extend to contracts between citizen and citizen of the same State, 
would control the pursuits of the planter, the grazier, the 
manufacturer, [and] the mechanic . . . .
64
 
The Court did not ignore this federalism apprehension.
65
  It seemed to 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16-17. 
 62. Id. at 17. 
 63. WINKELMAN, JOHN G. JOHNSON: LAWYER AND ART COLLECTOR, supra note 1, at 
176. 
 64. Appellees‟ Brief at 18, United States v. E. C. Knight Co., supra note 56 (quoting 
Veazie v. Moore, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852)). 
 65. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13. 
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hang its decision partially on this reasoning: “[I]t is vital that the 
independence of the commercial power and of the police power, and the 
delimitation between them . . . should always be recognized and observed, 
for while the one furnishes the strongest bond of union, the other is 
essential to the preservation of the autonomy of the States . . . .”
66
 
This decision for a time solidified a more formalistic view on 
Congress‟s Commerce Clause power.
67
 
To say that Knight was a landmark victory for Johnson would be to 
understate its true effect on his practice.  Knight helped catapult Johnson to 
the status of one of Wall Street‟s preeminent attorneys.  In particular, 
within a short time after Knight, Johnson defended “the American Tobacco 
Company, Northern Securities Company, Great Northern Railway, 
Northern Pacific Railway, Standard Oil Company and United States Steel 
Company” in major Supreme Court cases that dealt with a variety of 
complex legal matters.
68
 
B. The Court’s Subsequent Expansion of the Commerce Power 
Within a few years of Knight, the Court began to expand its 
interpretation of Congress‟s power under the Commerce Clause, perhaps 
bending to lawmakers‟ fears that “huge combinations of capital” were 
being “designed to dominate essential industries and the necessities of 
life.”
69
  For Johnson, this meant that it would become more difficult to use 
many of the same arguments that brought him success in Knight.  
Presciently, this prediction was confirmed with his involvement in 
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, where the Court held that the 
combination of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific Railway 
Companies in one holding entity constituted an illegal restraint of trade in 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. It is also important to note that Justice Harlan dissented in Knight, arguing that the 
Court‟s interpretation of the Commerce power was too narrow.  Id. at 21-24 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting).  He also drew on Gibbons, reasoning that commerce should encompass more 
than the “mere physical transportation of articles of property, and the vehicles or vessels by 
which such transportation is effected.”  Id.  The American Sugar acquisitions, he wrote, 
could be seen to have exerted an unlawful restraint on trade by virtue of their effect on 
prices and competition, notwithstanding the fact that they superficially involved only the 
sugar refining process in Pennsylvania.  Id. at 32-33.  Moreover, he alleged that such 
restraints “disturb[] or unreasonably obstruct[] freedom in buying and selling articles 
manufactured to be sold to persons in other States or to be carried to other States.”  Id. at 33.  
This reasoning was relied upon in later Commerce Clause cases.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 68. Gerard J. St. John, John G. Johnson:  Giant of the Philadelphia Bar, THE 
PHILADELPHIA LAWYER Vol. 69, No. 4 (Winter 2007), available at 
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/TPLWinter07Johnson?appNum=1  (last visited July 
26, 2011). 
 69. Winkelman, Carnegie, Frick and John G. Johnson, supra note 15, at 422. 
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violation of the Sherman Act.
70
 
In arguing Northern Securities, Johnson emphasized the productive 
and economic purpose of the combination, stressing that its principal 
effects were “to help competitive interstate and international commerce” by 
increasing railroad use and efficiency from the eastern seaboard to the 
Pacific Ocean.
71
  He also stressed, as he did in Knight, that any restraint on 
commerce as a result of the combination would be incidental and 
negligible, and reading the act to reach the transaction would render its 
application unconstitutional.
72
  The Court rejected this characterization of 
the Sherman Act and refused to extend Knight to the facts, reasoning: 
[T]he act is not limited to restraints of interstate and international 
trade or commerce that are unreasonable in their nature, but 
embraces all direct restraints imposed by any combination, 
conspiracy or monopoly upon such trade or commerce . . . 
[including] combinations even among private manufacturers or 
dealers whereby interstate or international commerce is [affected 
or] restrained.
73
 
The implicit effect of the holding was to expand Congress‟s reach 
under the Commerce Clause despite Knight. 
Justice Holmes dissented, joined by Justices Fuller, White and 
Peckham, expressing worry that the decision would have the effect of 
expanding the scope of federal regulatory authority over countless local 
transactions.
74
  His words on the wisdom of the Court‟s decision reflected 
his concern: 
Great cases like hard cases make bad law.  For great cases are 
called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the 
law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate 
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts 
the judgment.  These immediate interests exercise a kind of 
hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem 
doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law 
 
 70. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 197 (1904).  For more on the intricacies 
of Northern Securities, see WINKELMAN, JOHN G. JOHNSON: LAWYER AND ART COLLECTOR, 
supra note 1, at 207-23. 
 71. Winkelman, John G. Johnson and the N. Sec. Case, 15 TEMP. L. Q. 493, 503-04 
(1941).  However, as will be shown, Johnson‟s argument in Northern Securities for a more 
rational, economic-based approach to analyzing antitrust cases was subsequently embraced 
by the Court.  See infra Section V (reciting and discussing Johnson‟s arguments). 
 72. See Knight, 156 U.S. at 9 (detailing this argument). 
 73. N. Sec., 193 U.S. at 331 (emphasis in original). 
 74. See id. at 410-11 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the restraint on the freedom of the 
members of a combination caused by their entering into partnership is a restraint of  trade, 
every such combination, as well the small as the great, is within the act.”). 
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will bend.
75
 
This concern seemed to signal the Court‟s later approach as it 
eventually embraced a much broader interpretation of Congress‟s power 
under the Commerce Clause in cases even outside of the antitrust context.
76
 
Johnson‟s adamant insistence on the viability of the Court‟s 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause in Knight led to other losses.
77
  
Despite these losses, some of the positions Johnson skillfully articulated in 
Knight and Northern Securities have frequently resurfaced.
78
  It is 
important to keep in mind that, even though Johnson‟s arguments were 
 
 75. Id. at 400-01. 
 76. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) 
(holding that, if interstate commerce is affected, Congress can use its Commerce Clause 
power to ban discrimination in places of public accommodation despite the inherently local 
nature of the conduct in question); see also Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 45, at 
384-85 (discussing the pro-regulation shift in the Court‟s Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
from 1937 until 1995). 
 77. In 1907, the Roosevelt Administration brought suit against American Tobacco Co., 
alleging violations of the Sherman Act; the defendant hired Johnson as lead counsel.  United 
States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 183-84 (1911).  See Daniel A. Crane, Harmful 
Output in the Antitrust Domain: Lessons from the Tobacco Industry, 39 GA. L. REV. 321, 
327-28 (2005) (discussing the facts of the suit and noting that, at one point, the subsidiaries 
which constituted American Tobacco held roughly ninety percent of the cigarette market).  
In the case, the government alleged that American Tobacco “proceeded to expand its control 
over . . . facets of the tobacco industry through a series of aggressive tactics, such as pricing 
below cost to discipline . . . [other] tobacco manufacturers into cooperation” all in violation 
of the antitrust laws.  Id. at 328 (citing Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 157).  The Court ordered 
the dissolution of American Tobacco.  Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 181-83.  The Court also 
flatly rejected the argument that the combination should be treated as beyond Congress‟s 
regulatory reach in light of Knight solely because the majority of its business was 
technically confined to tobacco manufacturing activities that did not directly affect interstate 
commerce.  See id. at 183-84 (rejecting American Tobacco‟s argument in this regard).  
Specifically, the Court stated: 
We do not, for the sake of brevity, moreover, stop to examine and discuss the 
various propositions urged in the argument at bar for the purpose of 
demonstrating that the subject-matter of the combination which we find to exist 
and the combination itself are not within the scope of the Anti-trust Act because 
when rightly considered they are merely matters of intrastate commerce and 
therefore subject alone to state control. We have done this because the want of 
merit in all the arguments advanced on such subjects is so completely 
established by the prior decisions of this court . . . as not to require restatement.  
Id. 
 78. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42-45 (2005) (O‟Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“We enforce the „outer limits‟ of Congress‟[s] Commerce Clause authority not for their 
own sake, but to protect historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal 
encroachment and thereby to maintain the distribution of power fundamental to our 
federalist system of government.” (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 
(1995))); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-58 (discussing the importance of maintaining an 
outer limit of the Commerce Clause power so as to prevent evisceration of the dual system 
of government established by the structure of the Constitution). 
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waged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries while negative 
public sentiment was mounting against industry,
79
 he was still able to 
convince the Court to adopt a more restrained view of the Commerce 
power in Knight, after such a view had become increasingly unpopular 
among the citizenry and political establishment of the United States.
80
 
V.  JOHNSON‟S INFLUENCE ON ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE 
Interestingly enough, Johnson‟s argument in Northern Securities that 
suggested the benefits of a perceived anticompetitive combination should 
be compared to its detrimental economic effects actually foreshadowed the 
Court‟s antitrust jurisprudence in later years.
81
  As noted, in arguing 
Northern Securities, Johnson contended that the Sherman Act should not 
condemn activities that lacked pernicious intent and anticompetitive effect 
and that the Court should inquire into the pro-competitive justifications of 
any combination.
82
  As Johnson argued specifically: 
Such alliances as that of Burlington with the Northern Pacific and 
Great Northern, are particularly valuable, because of the 
opportunity thereby afforded of securing a large number of 
markets in a great and rich territory, under a fairly permanent 
transportation policy.  They are of enormous value to the people 
along the lines of the railroads, to the country generally, and to 
the world . . . . To transact business large investments must be 
made, and the condition prerequisite to such investments, is 
reasonable assurance of continuance . . . . It is incumbent upon 
the United States, when it seeks to condemn an arrangement 
which has promoted the interest of the whole Nation, by 
pretending it was intended to restrain trade, to establish, very 
convincingly, the existence of the illegal intent it alleges to have 
existed.
83
 
The Court ultimately endorsed a “rule of reason” approach that 
permitted such an inquiry.
84
  This is one of Johnson‟s greatest and most 
enduring legal achievements.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Johnson himself 
argued on behalf of the defendants in the first Supreme Court case formally 
 
 79. Brexel, supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 80. See supra notes 60-62. 
 81. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (applying 
a test which considers whether the challenged conduct unreasonably restrains trade, and 
suggesting that this test requires an inquiry into the “facts peculiar to the business”). 
 82. See Winkelman, John G. Johnson and the N. Sec. Case, supra note 71 and 
accompanying text. 
 83. Brief for Appellant at 17, N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (No. 
277). 
 84. See infra text accompanying note 98. 
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adopting the rule of reason:  Standard Oil Co. v. United States (“Standard 
Oil”).
85
 
The facts leading to Standard Oil are well documented.  As Barnie 
Winkelman noted: 
The oil monopoly—America‟s first great industrial 
combination—had become an established fact as early as 1877, 
with a single company controlling at least ninety percent of the 
business of refining and marketing petroleum . . . . The rush to 
the oil fields had rivaled the incursion into California, 
precipitated by the sudden discovery of gold . . . .
86
 
The initial positive reception to Standard Oil had slowly begun to 
wear off, however, near the end of the nineteenth century as the public 
developed an increasing fear of the company‟s sales practices.
87
  Namely, 
Standard Oil practiced predatory price discrimination in order to maintain 
its hold on the oil markets in various regions of the country, and its 
tarnished executives frequently sought to evade the law when it seemed to 
help maximize profits.
88
  It was finally in 1907, after numerous state-
initiated prosecutions of its subsidiaries, that Standard Oil was indicted and 
President Taft‟s Attorney General, George Wickersham, brought a suit 
seeking dissolution of the combination under the Sherman Act.
89
  At the 
time the action was brought, Standard Oil controlled roughly over half of 
the oil refining activities in the United States.
90
  Standard Oil retained 
Johnson as defense counsel. 
The government‟s case against Standard Oil was concrete and 
extensive.  At the foundation of the case was the allegation that both John 
D. and William Rockefeller created numerous partnerships engaged in the 
business of refining crude oil, and that, through these partnerships, the 
executives of Standard Oil orchestrated an anticompetitive and illegal 
combination.
91
  At the time of most of the alleged misconduct, the 
combination had controlled over “90 per cent of the business of producing, 
shipping, refining and selling petroleum” in the United States.
92
 
Moreover, the government attempted to show that Standard Oil used 
various illegal share transfers within its subsidiary partnerships to restrain 
 
 85. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65-68 (1911) (endorsing the rule of 
reason). 
 86. WINKELMAN, JOHN G. JOHNSON: LAWYER AND ART COLLECTOR, supra note 1, at 
237. 
 87. Id. at 239. 
 88. See id. (discussing the business practices that made Standard Oil a subject of ill 
repute). 
 89. See id. at 234 (chronicling the events that led to the case against Standard Oil). 
 90. Id. at 236. 
 91. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 32 (1911). 
 92. Id. at 32-33. 
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trade in oil and petroleum byproducts.
93
  It further alleged the means by 
which Standard Oil carried out its monopoly and misconduct: 
[T]he combination and its members obtained large preferential 
rates and rebates in many and devious ways over their 
competitors from various railroad companies, and that by means 
of the advantage thus obtained many, if not virtually all, 
competitors were forced either to become members of the 
combination or were driven out of business . . . .
94
 
In defending Standard Oil, Johnson naturally raised the same 
contentions that he did in Knight, arguing that his client‟s business 
activities did not exert a direct and unreasonable effect on interstate 
commerce because those activities only involved the refining process and 
were thus outside of Congress‟s regulatory power under the Commerce 
Clause.
95
  Yet, by this time—and in the face of cases like Northern 
Securities—Knight had become a toothless decision.
96
  Indeed, the Court 
rejected the argument and ultimately held that Standard Oil should be 
dissolved.
97
 
However, in issuing its decision, the Court relied on the assumption 
that Standard Oil comprised an unreasonable combination in restraint of 
trade, implying that the mere fact that the company maintained a market 
monopoly was not necessarily sufficient to find liability under the antitrust 
laws.
98
  This holding was based on Johnson‟s argument that mere exclusion 
by competition in itself should not be the basis for a finding of 
monopolization.  Rather, liability should only be inferred where a 
monopoly was maintained or acquired via exclusion by illegal means:
99
 
There may be fraud, intimidation and other tortious acts, of a 
systematic rather than sporadic character and operation, and 
therefore effective as means of exclusion.  It is along these lines 
that we reach the exclusion which is the essence of monopolizing 
. . . . It is not therefore a test of monopolizing what properties and 
plants a concern owns, or how extensive their product is, or how 
great the volume of its business is in relation to the whole of the 
business or the business of anybody else, or what power is in the 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 68-69 (discussing counsel‟s argument invoking the Commerce Clause). 
 96. See id. (noting that this argument was “so necessarily and expressly decided to be 
unsound as to cause the contentions to be plainly foreclosed and to require no express 
notice”). 
 97. Id. at 79-81. 
 98. Id. at 75-77. 
 99. See Brief for Appellants at 92, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) 
(no number in original) (discussing the factors that should be taken into consideration when 
assessing whether a combination runs afoul of the antitrust laws). 
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course of trade inherent in that volume of business.  The essential 
thing is [whether] there [are] illegal means used to restrain and 
exclude others.
100
 
The victory for Johnson in this case, thus, rested precisely with the 
word “unreasonable.”  The Court recognized that activities regulated under 
the antitrust laws should reflect true economic principles and concerns.
101
  
It explained that its decision against Standard Oil rested on the company‟s 
anticompetitive conduct which suggested “a conviction of a purpose and 
intent which . . . [was] so certain as practically to cause the subject not to 
be within the domain of reasonable contention.”
102
  Thus, Johnson‟s 
pragmatic approach in favor of the “rule of reason” that he first endorsed in 
Northern Securities was finally embraced. 
Although Standard Oil was ostensibly limited to the Sherman Act‟s 
regulatory provisions with regard to monopolies, the Court has 
subsequently endorsed economic reasonableness inquiries as appropriate in 
various other cases falling under the antitrust laws.
103
  Thus, Johnson‟s 
contributions in the latter regard are among his most important and 
enduring. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Johnson‟s successes were a function of his remarkable legal skills.  
However, it is also true that his losses never diminished the respect he had 
earned among his peers.  Justice Henry Brown once stated, “Speaking 
among ourselves [in the Supreme Court of the United States], we call Mr. 
Johnson „The King of the American Bar.‟”
104
  Indeed, this article cannot 
adequately express Johnson‟s brilliance in arguing the cases discussed.  It 
presents only a small piece of his life and career.  Many of the arguments 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. WINKELMAN, JOHN G. JOHNSON: LAWYER AND ART COLLECTOR, supra note 1, at 243 
(“The court had in fact adopted the contention which Johnson had so strongly urged upon it 
in the Northern Securities case . . . [where h]e had fought against a ruling which would 
condemn „bigness‟ as such . . . .”). 
 102. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 77.  Justice Harlan criticized the test.  See id. at 89-91 
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Court‟s decision to 
conduct a reasonableness inquiry in antitrust cases is against the plain language of the 
Sherman Act and amounts to “judicial legislation”). 
 103. See, e.g., Nat‟l Collegiate Athletic Ass‟n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 117 (1984) (concluding that the rule of reason approach should be applied in some 
circumstances when assessing organizations that require a “certain degree of cooperation . . . 
if the type of competition that . . . member institutions seek to market is to be preserved”); 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-60 (1977) (holding that 
certain types of vertical restraints should be analyzed under the rule of reason where price is 
not a controlling factor). 
 104. Carson, supra note 2, at 119. 
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he waged have recurred throughout the twentieth century in the Court‟s 
Commerce Clause and antitrust cases.  But it is important to remember that 
Johnson first waged them in a tumultuous political environment for 
business interests—not because he necessarily sympathized with his 
client‟s causes—but because he took seriously his role as an advocate. 
 
